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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
John P. Huttman
San Francisco State University
"Inequality is what economics should be all about," argued
the late R.H. Tawney. It isn't, because concern with the patt-
erns of distribution of wealth and income is shared with pro-
duction, upon which consumption is contingent. Concentration
of wealth and unequal levels of income largely reflect the patt-
erns of returns to labor and investment in a traditional capit-
alist economy. Additionally, income tromfers, rationalized on
other than a labor or investment compensation basis, alter the
patterns of income and wealth holdings. Pronounced economic in-
equality, while prevalent in capitalist economies, would not
seem to result from the market mechanism. Broadly based owner-
ship of the means of production, by workers and others, perhaps
linked to co-determination schemes for direction of production
policies, has evolved as a potential alternative to wealth con-
centrations of an extreme form as a source of investment capital.
It should be cautioned that the feasibility of this investment
source substitute for wealth formation has not yet been fully
established.
Capitalism, through either compensatory redistribution
schemes or restructuring of the capital mobilization mechanism,
embodies the potential for eliminating, or at least reducing,
economic inequality as the basis and outcome of the market ori-
ented production system. Socialism, incorporating state control
of productive capacity, avoids reliance on capital generation
through private sources. Therefore, the socialist system does
not promulgate economic inequality through personal control of
and compensation for the output of capital equipment. However,
in socialist, as in capitalist societies, unequal compensation
to labor, and to those incapable of labor, is a source of econo-
mic inequality. It is evident that some degree of economic in-
equality exists in all modern industrial economies, socialist
or capitalist, and in most pre-industrial economies as well,
except perhaps for those operating at a primitive level. Con-
sidered in this context, it appears that the matter of economic
inequality may be examined from these three vantage points: the
desirability of lessening, or even eliminating, economic inequal-
ity4 the methodology by which economic inequality is assessed;
the devices by which economic inequality may be alleviated.
Enhancement of economic equality, within a narrow spread of
incomes, is a commonly eulogized ideal of a variety of societies,
including: agricultural systems based on a yeomanry, established
on family sized farms; systems largely composed of craftsmen,
shopkeepers and other small-scale entrepeneurs; modern capital-
ist systems where the bulk of the population prefers self-identi-
fication as 'middle class'; socialist societies incorporating
equalitarian goals. The socialist society has an explicit source
of inspsration, the Marxist edict: "From each according to his
ability, to each according to his needs." Equalitarian aims are
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more subdued in non-socialist societies, although tradItlOin
of a religious and moral nature may act to discourage obsten-
tatiousness, acquisitiveness and indifference to the needs of
others.
Behavioral scientists attribute some part of the total
of property and person related crimes and other anti-social
behavior to the poverty experiences of the perpetrators.
Economists and others cite the incapacitating effects, in ter-
ms of production and consumption, of poverty upon the work
and lives of people. The poor may be denied development of
talent and ability, condemned to perform at low levels of pro-
ductivity, and make uninformed choices as consumers. Although
more respect is usually reserved for the wealthy, their in-
adequacies also occasionally come under scrutiny. Recipients
of inherited rather than productively earned assets are common-
ly held in low esteem by economists because these beneficiar-
ies had not acquired their wealth as the result of astute mar-
ket decisions. Economists sometimes express a low regard of
the consumer expenditures, seemingly on items of increasing
triviality, originating with the wealthy.
It might be contended that a society with income and weal-
th distribution falling within a narrow range is likely to
accomodate to patterns of social homogeneity, with uniform
values prevailing. Whether or not this is perceived as desir-
able will depend upon the values of the observers. If critics
feel that increasing affluence, accompanied by expanded levels
of personal consumption, may corrupt or debilitate ideology
or morality, they may be persuaded to argue for diminished
material demands. However, it should be noted that no defin-
itive connection has been established between levels of mat-
erial consumption and degrees of affinity to ideological or
moral principle.
Narrowing of the range of income and wealth would not
go unnoticed by others than the previously poor, who would
be justified in celebrating their improved circumstances, and
the previously rich, who would have cause to lament their
decline. How profound an economic impact such a narrowing
might have would depend upon a number of factors, including
the former range, the pre and post range contraction distri-
bution patterns of income and wealth, the sources of invest-
ment and the patterns of consumption. Aggregate consumer
demand could be importantly effected by a narrowing of in-
come and wealth range, unless offsetting measures are inaug-
urated. Purchases of new automobiles and expensive applianc-
es, as well as investment in owner-occupied housing, are dis-
proportionately concentrated among more affluent elements in
most societies. Increased demand for public goods could have
a compensatory effect but, even then, there would be costs
associated with dislocation. In the absence of effective off-
setting public demand, diminished private demand for output
would have repercussions in terms of reduced investment and
employment-earnings opportunities.
Goals of removing families and individuals from near sub-
sistence levels and from positions of extreme affluence are
accorded different levels of priority under different economic
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systems and different Societies. Accessibility to economic
opportunity - epitomized as 'equal opportunity' - is implicit
in the rationale of the framework of both capitalism and soci-
alism. A divergence between theoretical and operational mod-
els resulting from the inaccessibility of workers to appropri-
ate positions commensurate with ability potential is likely
to diminish the efficiency of the system. Endorsement and im-
plementation of meritocracy-based hierarchies in production
firms, government administration and other activities, reflect
general acquiescence of this concept in modern economies. Ex-
tremes of wealth and income, existing on a large scale, tend
to frustrate the installation of meritocratic schemes.
The urgency for lessening economic inequality, at least in
part, is a function of range and distribution of income. A
predominantly affluent society, with relatively few people
experiencing extremes of great poverty or wealth, may be no-
ticeably unresponsive to demands for the elimination of these
extremes. In contrast, demands for redistribution may be
easily stimulated in a generally poor society having a very
wide range of economic inequality. Ironically, confiscation
of the assets of a wealthy few would probably make only a
weakly perceptible contribution to the welfare of a poverty
stricken mass. With respect to the pressures generated for
redistribution, anticipated effective gain may be subordinat-
ed to achievement of non-economic goals. Class consciousness
and ideological awareness may represent important forces in
stimulating change, irrespective of their economic effects.
Relatively superior economic position may generate satis-
faction among the recipients of material benefits, based upon
the relative deprivation of others. Economic disparity, per
se, as the source of incentive is not an attractive proposition.
It is conceivable that individuals may be motivated to perform
economic activities primarily because the rewards achieved great-
ly exceed those conferred on others for performing other tasks.
Consumption, in turn, may be pleasurable with the knowledge it
is denied to all but a few others at that level. The non-
economic counterpart to such economic response may be identifi-
ed with assumption of political position for the authority the
holder may exert over others. Argument for retention of econom-
ic inequality founded on disparity-related satisfaction has
its origins in a pre-industrial mentality, with more concern
displayed for the arrangements than the magnitude of output of
production. While modern economic man is formulated as ration-
al, some residual of economic disparity orientation is detect-
able in industrialized capitalist and socialist societies.
Enthusiasm for defending retntion or initiating reform of
patterns of economic inequality frequently exceeds the ability
of participants in the debate to define and analyze the problem.
Unless we can conceptualize the nature of economic inequality,
we cannot be confident we are employing the appropriate strat-
egies and are directing them to the intended objectives. Lorenz
Curve analysis is designed to measure with coefficients and
graphical portrayal the extent of economic inequality. In terms
of the Lorenz Curve diagram, cumulative percentage of households
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is measured along the horizontal axis, from left to right, and
cumulative percentage of wealth or of income is measured along
the right side vertical axis, from bottom to top. Because the
vertical axis measures either income or wealth, but not both
simultaneously, one graph can only show equality in the hold-
ing of wealth or equality in the distribution of income. The
entire length of each axis is equal to one hundred percent of
households, or of wealth or of income, respectively. A diagonal
line connects the point of zero percentage of households with
the point of one hundred percent of wealth or of income, to fom
a triangle of the lower right half of the graph. The origin,
in the lower right hand corner of the graph, is formed by the
juncture of the axis lines
Perfect equality in the distribution of wealth or of income
would occur in the case where the Lorenz Curve coincided with
the diagonal line, with cumulative percentages of households
having proportionate cumulative percentages of income or of
wealth. When either wealth or income is disproportionately
distributed, with a larger share to part of the househblds and
a smaller share to the rest, the Lorenz Curve assumes a bowed
shape, convex with respect to the origin. The greater the in-
equality with respect to either wealth or income, the more pro-
nounced the bowed shape or convexity. It is interesting to note
that in the case of the United States, the Lorenz Curve has not
changed its bowed shape perceptibly over the third quarter of
the Twentieth Century; its shape has apparently not changed sub-
stantially over the first half of the century. Over this period
the average size of households has decreased, with diminished
average family size and an increase in the share of unrelated
individuals of total households. The increased share of total
households represented by unrelated individuals is mainly
accounted for by the increasing numbers of surviving elderly
and, to a lesser extent, by divorce and other factors. Trans-
lated from household into population terms, the Lorenz Curve
would have a tendency to show greater inequality, in the con-
text of income shares, because of the disproportionate concen-
tration of elderly and the persistence of larger family size
in lower income categories. Tendencies for contrasting asset
holding extremes among the elderly than the population at large
suggests that wealth shares might appear even more unequal in
population than household terms. Income, although not assets,
of those at the lower end of the economic scale would be incr-
eased somewhat with the inclusion of various forms of public
assistance, in kind and in cash. Deficiencies in data - and its
format - for income distribution, and particularly for the distri-
bution of wealth shares, make such conclusions somewhat conject-
ural.
Comventional Lorenz Curve analysis is inadequate for assesS-
ment of economic inequality because it deals with income or with
wealth distribution at one point in time instead of over a
period of useful comparison - a lifetime. The lifetime measure
has greater validity than one point in time because household
income will change over the length of the productive and non-
productive years of the household members. Different types of
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households, in terms of occupations and other characteristics
of members, will experience different patterns of lifetime
earning or wealth distribution patterns. Manual workers will
have generally earlier entry into the workforcewad an earlier
peaking of annual earnings than will professional workers who
characteristically defer early entry and earnings for acquisit-
ion of additional qualifications. The typically higher peak
annual earnings during advanced years of the professional work-
er represent compensation for earlier non-remunerated training
periods. More advanced preparation embodies productivity in
the professional worker superior to that of the manual worker,
so that while the lifetime earnings of professional and manual
worker are likely to be closer together than their earnings at
any one point, they are unlikely to be equal. Uorkers in the
same experience-preparation stream, who might have somewhat
similar lifetime earnings have income discrepancies most likely
at one point in time because of different entry dates and seni-
ority-experience wage increments.
Lifetime rather than current earnings provides a more real-
istic framework for assessing the distribution of income inequal-
ity because the income available to the non-productive elderly,
normally in any modern society, can seldom be expected to remain
at the level of prior productive years, unless exceptional pro-
vision is undertaken. The economic needs of the elderly have
been interpreted as diminishing with age, presumably reinforced
by frugality in many cases. However, it would seem at least
equally plausible that the elderly, in these cases, are merely
accomodating to their contracting resources. Uncertainty about
the continuity of public forms of assistance, particularly if
elderly persons had been confronted with adverse experience in
this respect, would only seem to reinforce their apprehensive-
ness about the source of future income. Unclear prospects for
survival into some specific future period, concern for solvency
to cover unexpected events, ultimately funerals, and bequests
for relatives, compel many elderly to conserve dwindling estates.
In terms of wealth holdings, immobility of assets of the elderly
may tend to exaggerate the value of their accumulations. Con-
vertibility requirements of an urgent nature may substantially
depreciate estates. If the elderly, generally, were to indulge
in the levels of health care and other services and goods requir-
ed to prolong health, effectively resist senility and postpone
death, albeit temporarily, it would be reasonable to expect th-
eir expenditures would greatly exceed income and wealth in most
cases. Examined in a current context, the wealth shares of the
elderly are disportionately greater than the younger households.
But wealth accumulation for similar stream households, having
similar preferences, would be expected to tend toward cm r-grnce
over a lifetime period.
Current income inequality and wealth disparity may be attri-
butable to family size, just as it can be attributed in part to
age and work entry date differences. Child bearing and rear-
ing families represent a high opportunity cost, particularly
with a rising rate of female labor force participation, since
mothers frequently effectively sacrifice income for child care.
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Presumably, the satisfaction derived from juvinile offspring
compensates for potential earning losses which serve to re-
inforce current and even lifetime household income disparities.
Small family size permits increased capacity for wealth accumu-
lation, as compared with large family size, even though the
per capita consumption levels may exceed those of the large.
Household preference patterns with respect to consumption
and saving offer partial explanation of disparities of wealth
distribution, in current and, more particularly, lifetime terms,
in which the impact may be more obvious. Wealth holdings are
disproportionately concentrated with the elderly - or, more
accurately, with some elderly - as compared with the general
non-elderly households. Some of this accumulation of wealth
is attributable to inheritance and some through the appreci-
ation of invested wealth. And the elderly have simply had long-
er periods in which to accumulate wealth. Neglecting the
important elements of inheritance and appreciation, it is
obvious that at least some inequality in the holding of wealth
in a current context disappears when viewed in terms of life-
time saving. The current inequality of wealth holdings due
to restraint of consumption in favor of savings tends to per-
petuate and strengthen over the lifetime period.
Income disparities, examined on a current or even a life-
time basis, may reflect voluntary as well as involuntary econo-
mic inequality. Some individuals trade off income for leisure.
People quite frequently choose occupations in which they earn
less than the maximum they are capable of securing on the job
market. Their reaons for doing so may appear to be quite reas-
onable: they m~y oprfer to avoid high tension positions; they
reject working conditions they view as intolerable; they prefer
lower paying creative activities; they do not wish to exert
authority. Within national manpower requirements, modern econom-
ies generally recognize the advantages of workers selecting their
own jobs, even though, inadvertently and through choice, some
may achieve lower productivity and income as a result.
A dynamic economy, characterized by continuing economic
growth and technological innovation, will have an earning capac-
ity bias favoring later entrants. The entry earnings of current
entrants, in this situation, would be expected to exceed the
entry level earnings of those recruited to comparable positions
at earlier dates. In terms of academically acquired technical
skills, individuals become conveyors of change and rewards to
knowledge become an integral part of payments to entrant tech-
nically trained workers. Workers doing jobs of similar com-
plexity in newer industries might, in general, expect higher
earnings than their counterparts in older industries. Workers
with more capital equipment supporting their jobs have greater
likelihood of high earnings than those with less capital equip-
ment at their disposal, which is more likely to be the case
within the same industry for the later entrant. In both capit-
alism and socialism, there is a reluctance to divert, at the
expense of the recent entrant, some of this earning increase
to more veteran workers. The sheer complexity of calculation
of the division to be made, in addition to such factors as labor
morale, discourage this.
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A Lorenz Curve adjusted to measure lifetime earnings or
wealth accumulation would be expected to have less convexity
with respect to its origin than would a curve measuring cur-
rent income or wealth holdings. Households would be expect-
ed to have more similarity with respect to income or wealth
over a lifetime than at a particular point in time. Lifetime
income and wealth calculations present formidible data collect-
ion problems as well as problems of a methodological nature,
as to what constitutes a household or what period of time
actually represents a lifetime for a household composed of
different age groups, and entering and exiting members. Con-
ceptually, however, lifetime comparisons have greater valid-
ity than current comparisons. Briefly reviewed, lifetime
earnings or wealth holdings will differ as between households
because of different workforce entry dates, compensation for
work deferred training and productivity potential, savings -
consumption pattern variations, leisure and occupational pre-
ferences, length of periods for wealth accumulating opportun-
ities, household size and numbers of working members, and
other factors. Current income or wealth measurements distort
the degree of economic inequality between households because
they involve only one 'slice' of time, as compared with life-
time measures reflecting different stages of wealth and earn-
ing experiences over a prolonged interval.
Inequalities with respect to lifetime earnings and wealth
accumulation are likely to persist, to at least some degree,
in all modern industrial societies, whether capitalist or soci-
alist. Diminished disparities in pay scales, greater confor-
mity to family size norms, reduced opportunities for consumpt-
ion - savings variations and the substitution of public goods
and services for some share of private, can act to alleviate
household economic inequality. Some part of this inequality
is inevitable, however, because of differing preferences for
training and occupation, consumption patterns and the unlike-
ly universal coincidence of family size. Authorities in even
more ideologically doctrinaire systems would undoubtedly be
reluctant to introduce the costly and unpopular instruments
required to attempt to establish economic equality as between
households. The inevitability of household lifetime economic
inequality tends to magnify differences between households in
terms of current economic inequality.
Economic inequality is only partial explainable by inevi-
table differences from a household lifetime perspective or
from the somewhat exaggerated current income and wealth hold-
ing view. In addition to the differences attributable to house-
holds and the job market structure, previously referred to,
inheritance and earnings differentials unrelated to work per-
formance, training and responsibility, would appear to be major
explanatory variables. The first, inheritance, is obvious with
respect to its role in perpetuating economic inequality. As
families pass along wealth, offspring are provided with un-
earned advantages. These benefits can be translated by the
beneficiaries into attractive earning opportunities or they
can be parlayed into yet greater holdings of assets. Socialist
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societies may be less tolerant of inheritance than are capit-
alist societies, but no modern industrial societies are likely
to allow assets to be transmitted from source to beneficiary
completely intact. On the other hand, few societies, regard-
less of ideology, are dispossed to the confiscation of all
forms of inheritable assets. And wealth inheritance has its
equivalence in terms of position. Parents entrenched in
positions of prestige or prominence, with associated wealth
or perogatives, enhance the probability their offspring will
rise to comparable positions, under socialism as well as
under capitalism.
Economic theory, in spite of a huge volume of literature
dealing with the subject has little to contribute, of an appli-
cable nature, to the question of work-related rewards. Theory
concerned with wage rates in accordance with marginal product-
ivity has limited influence with respect to the hiring and
wage determination decisions of firms. In practice, it is
difficult to establish the marginal contributions of labor in
modern complex industry. It is no less difficult to relate
to output and profits the earnings of management than of pro-
duction workers. Bonuses and salary increments may rise more
rapidly in periods of increasing profits but they are unlike-
ly to decline dramatically - or at all, for that matter - with
reduced profit or even loss. Upper echelon management is the
main influence with respect to the level of its own remunerat-
ion, at least under capitalism, and tends to be somewhat gen-
erous in this regard. Under socialism as well the earnings of
higher management substantially exceed the incomes of blue
collar workers. In both socialist and capitalist systems, the
privileges and benefits extended to senior management, supple-
mentary to salaries, further reinforce economic disparities.
Monopoly in the labor market, under capitalism, creates
disparities in the incomes of workers in production and service
activities, even though these workers may perform comparable
tasks and have similar skill levels. Discriminatory practices
based on race, sex and age are examples of forms of monopoly
in the job market as are labor organization restrictions on
entry into employment. Professional workers, through their
organizations, also employ monopolistic tactics to control
their levels of remuneration. Entry or promotion eligibility
in certain types of work, based on political affiliation or
sympathy, could conceivably represent an analagous monopolist-
ic restriction in a doctrinaire socialist economy. Arbitrary
disparities and monopolistic practices with respect to income,
and inheritance with respect to wealth, would appear to be
important determinants of economic inequality not encompassed
by the area of inevitable inequality analyzed earlier.
There is no formula for determining the range of income
and wealth disparities tolerable within a 'just' society.
Economists are capable of specifying optimal wealth holding
and income distribution patterns with respect to designated
charactistics of the economy and identified goals, such as
maximizing growth or employment opportunities. But the econ-
omist cannot pretend to be able to identify the wealth
holding and income distribution patterns which would 'optimize'
satisfaction among the population. Abstract models borr-
owed from utility, indifference curve and modern welfare
theory shed little light on practical problems of economic
distribution and recipient satisfaction.
Questions raised regarding the relevance of economics in
the construction of an ideal pattern of wealth holding and
income distribution are not intended to convey an overall
sense of dismay about the applicability of the discipline to
problems associated with economic inequality. If economists
are incapable of providing practical definitions of economic
'optimality', in terms of the relationship of income and weal-
th patterns to satisfaction, it should be remembered that
other social scientists are also inadequate to the task of
formulating an operational model of the 'just' society. The
answers to questions such as what constitutes an ideal society
reflect value judgements. Social scientists can analytically
describe an issue, trace its ramifications and suggest its
consequences, costs and benefits, but the ultimate choice must
be made by those who anticipate benefit to society and, perhaps,
themselves.
The matter of dealing with economic inequality is some-
what simplified if attention is focussed on the areas sus-
ceptible to change rather than on the whole, including the
intractable areas where some degree of economic inequality,
even in lifetime rather than current terms, is inevitable.
Pay-off to effort is likely to materialize with attention to
the concentration of wealth due to inheritance and high income
due to excessive reward and monopolistic practices, on the
one hand, and on the other poverty due to causes other than
voluntary work abstinence and large family size. Any perman-
ent solution to the poverty-related problems of work evading
employables and expanding families, while they might include
material assistance, are also linked to work orientation
counseling and family planning guidance, respectively.
Generous rewards, in the form of earnings and wealth
accumulation which are unrelated to productive motivation and
are not the result of self-accumulation, can be reduced through
the instrument of taxation. Inheritance tax laws can be stren-
gthened to restrict estate transfers to modest levels. The
net effect of federal taxes on personal income in the United
States, on balance, appears to be that essentially the same
rate is levied on income within a broad range, while state
and local taxes are regressive somewhat with respect to lower
income households. The internal revenue service, if it oper-
ates reasonably cheaply and efficiently, as in the case of the
United States, represents an accessible mechanism for re-
distributing income and wealth holdings to some extent. There
would seem to be some opportunity to reduce exemptions and
deductions for income and for investment of higher income house-
holds. However, any significant changes are bound to incon-
venience long established beneficiaries. For instance, elim-
ination of interest deductions and local tax credits on prop-
erty of homeowners, which are of disproportionately greater
benefit to the wealthy than the poor, would most likely have
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a disruptive impact not only on the wealthy, but on the whole
economy. Nonetheless, the tax structure modification altern-
ative to other forms of economic redistribution retains con-
siderable potential.
The negative income tax permits the transfer of income,
mechanically and inexpensively, as merely the reversal of the
conventional flow from taxpayer to internal revenue service.
The extension of income in this manner would probably appear
as more 'legitimate' to the general public than the forms of
assistance it would replace. It would remove stigma-ridden
intermediaries, although in the process it would eliminate
useful as well as redundant aspects of official communication
with the poor. The patterns of consumption by the poor, re-
inforced by the transfer of income, would be largely inde-
pendent of any authority. Insofar as the poor are intimi-
dated or co-erced by visible echelons of functionaries, the
benefits of their removal are obvious. But, to some extent,
poverty may be at least reinforced by the decisions of its
victims, so there is no assurance that funds transferred in
this manner would be fully effective in relieving poverty
situations.
A negative income tax related to earnings permits income
transfers to the poor without supressing their motivation to
wor, in cases where they are eligible to do so. Incentives
to increased earnings are built into transfer scales, so that
each additional amount of income earned, to a specified level,
reduces transfers by a smaller amount. When earnings are low,
transfer reductions would be slight, whereas transfer pay- -
mante would be reduced substantially as income rose to a more
nearly adequate level. However, the comprehensive adoption of
a negative income tax scheme must also be linked to minimum
wage legislation sufficient for assuring that a negative
income tax for the working poor does not merely become a sup-
plement to inadequate work remuneration, a sort of modern
'Speenhamland plan'.
The involuntarily unemptoyed and those ineligible for
work by virtue of age, disability, number of dependents and
similar reasons cannot rely on any objective economist-con-
ceived formula to reveal the levels of income transfers to
which they are to be entitled. Economists are limited to
describing the living conditions which certain levels of trans-
fers can purchase for recipients. In the case of families,
at least, it would seem reasonable t extend transfers at a
level which might offer fair prospects for offspring to escape
poverty in adulthood. Provision of universal essential goods
arI services, particularly such elements as medical care,
sh~oull basically be premised upon economies of scale and
benefits to aggregate society. But there may also be spill-
over benefits to the poor. The poor would derive additional
benefits from any differences between a universally access-
ible health service, presumably with public scrutiny of quality,
and a service reserved exclusively for low income clients.
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